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and what it delivers 
creates financial 
challenges for 
education leaders as 
they seek funding 
to provide for all 
students.
Meeting the Needs of 
Students with Disabilities
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D. & Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Ed.D.
The Individuals with Disabilities Edu-cation Act (IDEA, 2005) requires states, through local school boards, to provide students with disabili-
ties with a free appropriate public education 
(FAPE) in the least restrictive environment 
consistent with the content of their Individual-
ized Education Programs (IEPs). As important 
as it is to educate students with disabilities, the 
cost of serving these children is much higher 
than that of their peers in regular education.
In the IDEA, Congress included language 
stipulating that the federal government 
would pay up to 40% of the excess cost 
associated with educating children with dis-
abilities (20 U.S.C.A. § 1411(a)(2) (A)(ii))). 
However, Congress has never come close to 
providing this level of funding. The dispar-
ity between what Congress promised and 
what it delivers creates financial challenges 
for education leaders as they seek funding to 
provide for all students.
The first Supreme Court review of the 
Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act, renamed the IDEA in 1990, addressed 
the level of services to be afforded children 
with disabilities. In Board of Education of 
the Hendrick Hudson Central School Dis-
trict v. Rowley (1982), a dispute from New 
York over whether a student with a hearing 
impairment was entitled to the services of 
a sign-language interpreter, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the local board did not 
have to provide her with such assistance. 
The Court held that the board only had 
to offer the student a program providing 
“some educational benefit” (p. 200) rather 
than one designed to maximize her abilities.
Over the years, while paying lip service to 
the importance of Rowley’s “some educa-
tional benefit” standard, the Third Circuit 
(Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate 
Unit 16, 1988, p. 184; Oberti v. Board of 
Education of the Borough of Clementon 
School District, 1993) and Sixth Circuit 
(Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County 
Department of Education, 2004) upped the 
ante by requiring boards to provide students 
with IEPs with programs affording them 
“meaningful benefit.”
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit upheld 
Rowley’s “some educational benefit” 
standard in Endrew F. v. Douglas County 
School District RE-1 (2015). In Endrew F., 
the panel affirmed that a school board in 
Colorado complied with the IDEA by pro-
viding a child with autism with a program 
granting him “some educational benefit.” 
Later courts have interpreted this standard 
as requiring more than trivial or de minimis 
educational progress, adding to the confu-
sion by failing to define what boards must 
provide.
In light of the split between federal circuit 
courts, the Supreme Court entered the fray 
over the level of services school boards must 
provide students with disabilities in order to 
establish a national standard.
Endrew F. v. Douglas County 
School District RE-1
Endrew F. involved a student in Colorado 
with autism and attention deficit hyperactiv-
ity disorder whose disabilities affected his 
cognitive functioning, language, and read-
ing skills along with his social and adap-
tive abilities. The student attended a public 
school from preschool to fourth grade, 
receiving special education and related 
services pursuant to his IEP. The child’s 
parents, dissatisfied with their son’s progress 
in fourth grade, rejected the IEP educators 
developed for the fifth grade, removed him 
from the public school, and enrolled him in 
a private school that specialized in educating 
children with autism.
On removing their son from the pub-
lic school and placing him in the private 
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setting, the parents filed a due pro-
cess complaint seeking tuition reim-
bursement for the latter. The parents 
claimed that public school officials 
committed procedural errors by 
not adequately reporting their son’s 
progress, not conducting a func-
tional behavioral assessment (FBA), 
and not implementing a behavior 
intervention plan (BIP). The parents 
further contended that the proposed 
IEP was substantively inadequate 
because it did not allow their son to 
make meaningful progress in school.
Judicial History
Convinced that school officials 
provided the child with a FAPE, 
an administrative law judge (ALJ) 
denied the parents’ request for 
tuition reimbursement. Subse-
quently, in an unpublished opinion, 
the federal trial court in Colorado 
upheld the ALJ’s adjudication on the 
basis that the parents failed to prove 
board officials violated the IDEA by 
not providing their son with a FAPE 
(Endrew F. v. Douglas County 
School District RE-1, 2014).
On further review, the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed in favor of the 
school board (Endrew F. v. Douglas 
County School District RE-1, 2015). 
As an initial matter, the panel agreed 
that the procedural errors the par-
ents alleged did not deny their son 
a FAPE. While educators conceded 
that their descriptions of the child’s 
progress on the IEP could have been 
better, the court relied on substantial 
evidence in the record that the par-
ents were well aware of the student’s 
progress and actively participated in 
his education.
The court pointed out that the 
parents were in constant communi-
cation with their son’s teacher via 
face-to-face meetings as well as a 
notebook they sent back and forth 
about his behavior and other school 
activities. In addition, educators 
sent the parents quarterly progress 
reports along with report cards. 
Therefore, the court was satisfied 
that any gaps in reporting on the 
goals and objectives of the child’s 
IEP did not prevent the parents from 
participating meaningfully in their 
son’s education.
The Tenth Circuit was unable 
to uncover the procedural defect 
the parents alleged when educa-
tors chose not to conduct an FBA 
or develop a BIP for their son. 
Noting that the student was never 
subjected to a disciplinary change 
in placement, the court remarked 
that the IDEA required educators 
only to consider behavioral inter-
ventions. According to the court, 
educators met their duty because 
the IEPs included behavior plans 
that identified some of the child’s 
problem behaviors and spelled out 
ways to manage and reduce his 
misbehaviors.
The issue presented 
in Endrew F., namely 
whether children with 
disabilities should receive 
educational programming 
designed to provide 
“some education benefit” 
or “meaningful benefit” 
is, to say the least, 
difficult and will likely be 
costly for school boards. 
On another aspect of the proce-
dural issue, the court recognized that 
educators were in regular contact 
with the parents about their son’s 
actions as administrators arranged 
for autism and behavioral special-
ists to meet with his team to devise 
a new IEP for the child. The court 
observed that the new IEP was never 
implemented because the parents 
withdrew their son from school.
These facts persuaded the court 
that the record was filled with ways 
in which educators dealt with the 
child’s behavioral issues. In sum, 
the court agreed that board officials 
complied with the IDEA by con-
sidering behavioral interventions in 
determining that the child did not 
need a formal FBA and/or BIP.
The court began its analysis of 
the parents’ substantive challenges 
to their son’s IEP by reviewing their 
claim that the Tenth Circuit adopted 
the heightened meaningful educa-
tional benefit standard by which to 
judge the adequacy of his FAPE. Cit-
ing its own precedent (Urban v. Jef-
ferson County School District R-1, 
1996; Thompson R2-J School Dis-
trict v. Luke P., 2008), the court dis-
missed this claim, emphasizing that 
it always “subscribed to the Rowley 
Court’s ‘some educational benefit’ 
language in defining a FAPE” (p. 
1338). In fact, the court explained 
that it specifically declined to follow 
the higher standard of meaningful 
educational benefit advanced by the 
Third Circuit (Sytsema v. Academy 
School District No. 20, 2008).
Rounding its analysis, the court 
considered whether the board’s 
proposed IEP met Rowley’s “some 
educational benefit” standard. Rely-
ing on evidence of progress the child 
made under his previous IEPs, the 
court agreed that this strongly sug-
gested that the IEP proposed for 
his fifth grade year was reasonably 
calculated to confer educational ben-
efit. The court also decided that the 
child’s annual goals and objectives 
increased in difficulty from one year 
to the next, reflecting the progress he 
was making.
Further, the court concluded that 
educators worked collaboratively 
with the child’s parents as well as 
other service providers to address his 
behaviors as they arose while calling 
in specialists to address his actions 
when they escalated and so affirmed 
that the proposed IEP offered the 
child a FAPE.
Discussion
In a perfect world, districts would 
not have to worry about having ade-
quate financial resources to serve all 
children. However, at a time when 
the economy is less than robust, 
acquiring the resources to educate 
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all children presents educators with 
challenges. At the same time, edu-
cators do not want to be forced to 
make utilitarian judgments about 
which children are entitled to costly 
educational services.
The issue presented in Endrew F., 
namely whether children with dis-
abilities should receive educational 
programming designed to provide 
“some education benefit” or “mean-
ingful benefit” is, to say the least, 
difficult and will likely be costly for 
school boards. Moreover, while the 
Supreme Court is one member short 
of a full bench insofar as the late 
Justice Scalia has yet to be replaced, 
its having granted review more than 
seven months after his passing sug-
gests that the Justices will reach a 
majority judgment on the appropri-
ate standard.
Regardless of what standard the 
Supreme Court enunciates, it is 
important to recall that the “I” in 
IDEA stands for “individuals.” In 
other words, the Court cannot cre-
ate a “one size fits all” standard for 
children with disabilities. Even if the 
Court creates a clearer standard, a 
meaningful benefit for one child may 
be a minimal benefit for another 
student.
Consequently, regardless of the 
outcome in Endrew F., courts likely 
will continue evaluating the stan-
dard on a case-by-case basis in light 
of each child’s unique needs. Such 
an outcome is not necessarily bad 
because each case will help develop 
a clearer understanding of what is 
required of school boards even as 
doing so raises costs when they must 
provide heightened levels of services.
Disputes over the appropriate 
standard for providing FAPEs for 
students with disabilities are not 
exercises in semantics. “Some” 
can mean more than nothing while 
“meaningful” suggests something 
extra. While some courts have used 
“meaningful” to describe a standard 
as being more than trivial, the Third 
Circuit made it clear that it referred 
to a standard designed to confer 
significant benefits on students. Even 
though this standard sets a higher 
criterion, it stops short of ordering 
boards to offer the best possible edu-
cation or one maximizing the poten-
tial of children.
Even though this standard 
sets a higher criterion, it 
stops short of ordering 
boards to offer the best 
possible education or one 
maximizing the potential 
of children.
If anything, should the Supreme 
Court mandate a “meaningful ben-
efit” standard requiring more than 
de minimis programming in Endrew 
F., it is unlikely to end litigation over 
what constitutes a FAPE. Instead, 
debates will rage over whether chil-
dren must receive programming 
designed to help them achieve in a 
manner consistent with their abilities 
by having educational opportunities 
equal to those of their classmates 
who are not disabled. What remains 
of paramount importance for SBOs, 
their boards, and other educational 
leaders, are questions about how 
much more such a change would 
cost school systems dealing with 
already tight budgets and whether 
Congress will offer additional finan-
cial aid to enable boards to educate 
all children equitably.
Conclusion
Whether the Supreme Court 
unequivocally establishes a clear 
standard of educational program-
ming school boards must offer stu-
dents with disabilities in Endrew F. 
remains to be seen. Yet, even if the 
Court creates such a standard, given 
the individualized nature of IEPs, 
achieving it can be elusive.
What is relatively certain, though, 
is that regardless how the Court 
rules, litigation will continue over 
how much more boards must spend 
to educate students with disabili-
ties. Accordingly, it behooves SBOs 
and other education leaders to keep 
abreast of developments such as 
Endrew F. in the ever-changing world 
of the law of special education.
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